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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Chavis W. Jackson appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found Jackson
guilty of enticing a child through the internet. Jackson claims the district court erred by
refusing to give an entrapment instruction to the jury.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On August 27, 2017, Chavis W. Jackson posted an ad in the Spokane section on
Craigslist’s casual encounters page. (Tr., p.369, Ls.19-22, p.372, Ls.3-9, p.452, Ls.9-25;
Exs., p.15. 1) He titled the ad “It’s sunday… any mormon girls around?” (Exs., p.15
(ellipsis in original).) He attached a picture of a man pulling up his shirt and pulling out
his pants exposing his penis. (Exs., p.15; see Tr., p.452, Ls.9-25.) He stated in the ad that
he “want[ed] to find a girl that is down to go to church today . . . find an empty classroom
and mess around.” (Exs., p.15.)
In response to his ad, Jackson received an email from Haley in Coeur d’Alene,
Idaho. (Exs., p.16.) Their conversation transitioned to text messages, and Haley sent a
picture to Jackson. (Exs., pp.17, 19.) Their text-message conversation continued:
[2:34:42 p.m.] Jackson:

you’re super cute [smiley face] how old? Wanna
try to hit up a church?

[2:34:47 p.m.] Haley:

I’m 14. Almost 15!! [smiley face] it’s ok if I’m
too young for u, I understand.

[2:35:14 p.m.] Haley:

well we’re up in sandpoint until later this
afternoon.
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Some of the exhibits contain multiple documents. For ease of reference and consistent
with Jackson’s opening brief, the state cites the relevant page numbers in the consecutively
paginated PDF of the exhibits rather than the exhibit number or letter.
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[2:36:55 p.m.] Jackson:

Lol well I guess it fits with Mormon history?
Haha we can still meet yo if you want later.
Depends on what you wanna do

[2:38:26 p.m.] Haley:

lol

[2:40:51 p.m.] Jackson:

What time do you think you will be back? It
might be too late to find a church to go to. What
would you wanna do?

[2:41:30 p.m.] Haley:

well

[2:41:58 p.m.] Haley:

I really just want to get crazy [winking face] tired
of boys my age

[2:43:35 p.m.] Haley:

I don’t have much experience but am curious.

[2:46:14 p.m.] Jackson:

Well I’m petty sure your age of consent right? I
just moved here and it’s diff everywhere. We
can swap more pics if you want and meet up and
at least talk about how shitty the church is! Lol

[2:46:46 p.m.] Jackson:

What time are you thinking tonight

[3:15:58 p.m.] Haley

I’m not sure we’re looking for the same thing.
[winking face] think I’ll pass take care.

[3:30:33 p.m.] Jackson:

No worries! Sex stuff is fun tho. You should try
it some time [smiley face with halo]

(Exs., pp.59-60; see Tr., p.383, L.7 – p.387, L.23. 2)
A short time later, Jackson saw an ad titled “seeking older man for fun tonight!”
(Exs., p.24; see Tr., p.406, Ls.11-19.) It reminded him of the conversation he just had with
Haley. (Tr., p.406, Ls.11-19.) Jackson responded to the ad and had a conversation with
an individual who subsequently identified herself as Natalie:
[5:14 p.m.] Jackson:

awww last night in town? Where are you
heading back to?

[5:17 p.m.] Natalie:

hi! I live in seattle area. hoe old r u

[5:19 p.m.] Jackson:

hi! I’m 30. how about you?

2

For this and all similar tables, the content of the communication is recreated verbatim.
The time stamps come from the cited exhibit. The names of the individuals sending the
communications come from the cited testimony at trial.
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[5:21 p.m.] Natalie:

oh cool I’m 14. almost 15 though and very
mature lol!! too young for u? [smiley face]

[5:23 p.m.] Jackson:

Nope [smiley face] Wanna text? What’s your
name?

[5:38 p.m.] Jackson:

we can probably meet up whenever

[5:44 p.m.] Natalie:

Yay!!!! [winking face] i’m natalie what’s ur
name? ya text me [phone number]

[5:45 p.m.] Jackson:

ohhh that’s werid. I thought it was haley [smiley
face]

[5:57 p.m.] Natalie:

oh haley is my stripper name [winking face]
sorry to bother you good luck

[6:00 p.m.] Jackson:

hahahahah I dunno what your angle is but I want
in. What are we doing here?

[6:06 p.m.] Natalie:

lol well u tell me. what do I want to do?? I’m
here staying with my sister and should have the
hotel room to myself in a bit

[6:09 p.m.] Jackson:

haha ok can i call u?

[6:10 p.m.] Natalie:

nonindknt think so.

[6:11 p.m.] Jackson:

lol ok so just showing up at a hotel to fuck you
while family is out? sounds fun

[6:15 p.m.] Natalie:

Lol is that what u had in mind? I’m actually a
virgin [smiley face] so kinda scared..but also
excited!!

[6:17 p.m.] Jackson:

Sure [smiley face] I’ll take it easy on you. WE
can try anal too. And we can see how well you
can suck a dick. Are you on birth control? Your
first time you should feel a dick sliding in rather
than a condom.

[6:35 p.m.] Natalie:

mmmmm whoa that’s a lot to take in lol! sounds
yummy though [winking face] I’m not on birth
control do u have condoms?

[6:37 p.m.] Jackson:

I do. OR if anal we dont need them.

[6:39 p.m.] Jackson:

when can I come over?

[6:40 p.m.] Natalie:

?? ok I’ve never done anal..I mean I’m 14 years
old lol!! doesithurt? Does it feel good? kinda
nervous not sure about this

3

[6:43 p.m.] Jackson:

well let me call you and we can talk about it
[smiley face] It feels good. and shouldn’t hurt

(Exs., pp.62-67; see
- Tr., p.408, L.22 – p.419, L.22.)
Natalie then told Jackson she was in room 301 in the Red Robin hotel in Coeur
d’Alene, and the two continued talking about meeting up. (Exs., pp.67-74.) The following
exchange then took place:
[7:45 p.m.] Jackson:

cool okay! Just to be clear this is just to hang
out! I am not planning or promising anything
sexual. I’m pretty sure you are age of consent but
it’s kinda confusing looking online while
driving. I don’t wanna get in trouble

[7:49 p.m.] Natalie:

wtf Tim!!! thats not what I said! I don’t want to
just hang outs if I wanted to hang out I wud have
gone with my sister lol

[7:50 p.m.] Natalie:

if u don’t want to come forget it. I’ll just go
swimming in the pool lol

[7:51 p.m.] Jackson:

lol I’m just not making any promises!! Hanging
out will still be fun?

[7:53 p.m.] Natalie:

lol seriously don’t want to jus hang out..sorry.
we only hav a couple hours anyway. It’s ok, you
seem scared..I understand. take care

[7:57 p.m.] Jackson:

Lol Just meet up

[7:59 p.m.] Natalie:

k come up!!!! [smiley face] [smiley face]

[8:04 p.m.] Jackson:

I’m just getting pulled over for speeding ahhhh I
hope it doesn’t take very long. Just go swimming
or something and I’ll find the pool and just meet
you by the pool

[8:06 p.m.] Natalie:

LOL!!!! sorry! I’ll just be in the room k

[8:08 p.m.] Jackson:

I don’t know how long this is going to take so
you might as well do something fun. Plus going
up to your hotel room like that feels a lot like to
catch a predator something haha

(Exs., pp.74-76.)
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Natalie and Jackson exchanged a few more emails about meeting up, and then
Jackson went to the third floor of the Red Robin hotel and ducked into the stairwell. (Exs.,
pp.76-77; Tr., p.215, L.15 – p.216, L.12.)

Agent Sutehall with the Department of

Homeland Security, who had been roleplaying as Natalie and Haley, walked into the
stairwell and arrested Jackson. (Tr., p.216, Ls.13-23; see Tr., p.125, Ls.10-13.)
A grand jury indictment charged Jackson with enticing a child through the internet.
(Aug., pp.1-2. 3) Jackson remained silent at his arraignment, so the district court entered a
plea of not guilty. (R., p.49.) Before trial, Jackson requested the standard entrapment jury
instruction. (R., p.85.)
At trial, Jackson took the stand and denied that he “solicit[ed] a child for sexual
purposes.” (Tr., p.435, Ls.3-8.) He told the jury that he had figured “Natalie” was a guy
who was just trying “to mess with people.” (Tr., p.421, Ls.4-16.) He testified that he
continued the conversation with “Natalie” and showed up at the hotel because he “wanted
to find out who was messing with [him].” (Tr., p.431, Ls.4-7.)
After the presentation of evidence, the parties and the district court discussed the
jury instructions. (Tr., p.506, L.25 – p.515, L.14.) The district court noted that the parties
and the court “had a meeting both on Tuesday in chambers where we went over these
instructions, and we also had a meeting this morning in chambers where we went over
some of the instructions.” (Tr., p.507, Ls.6-9.) The district court refused the entrapment
instruction and implied that it had already explained its reasoning for doing so, presumably
in one of the two earlier jury instruction conferences, neither of which appear in the record.

3

Contemporaneous with the filing of this brief, the state has filed a motion to augment the
record with a copy of the Superseding Indictment.
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(Tr., p.514, Ls.2-17 (“The Court’s indicated it would not give the entrapment
instruction.”).)
The jury found Jackson guilty of enticing a child through the internet. (R., p.196.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years with three years fixed. (R.,
pp.215-16.) Jackson timely appealed. (R., p.12.)
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ISSUE
Jackson states the issue on appeal as:
Did the trial court err by refusing to give an entrapment instruction?
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Jackson failed to show that the district court erred by refusing to give an
entrapment instruction?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err By Refusing To Give An Entrapment Instruction
A.

Introduction
The district court properly refused to give an entrapment instruction. The Idaho

Supreme Court has expressly held that a defendant may assert an entrapment defense only
if the defendant first concedes that the crime occurred. State v. Barton, 154 Idaho 289,
291-92, 297 P.3d 252, 254-55 (2013). Thus, Idaho law compelled the district court to
refuse the entrapment instruction because, as Jackson concedes, he denied that he had the
requisite intent to commit the crime charged. (Appellant’s brief, p.7.)
Citing Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988), Jackson argues that
conceding the crime occurred is not a prerequisite to asserting the defense of entrapment.
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) But “the Mathews decision did not rest on constitutional grounds
and is not binding on the states.” Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 163, 139 P.3d 762, 765
(Ct. App. 2006). The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Barton thus squarely forecloses
Jackson’s only argument on appeal.
Even if Idaho law did not preclude Jackson from raising the entrapment defense,
the district court did not err in refusing to give the instruction because the evidence did not
support the entrapment instruction. Presenting the defendant with an option to either
violate the law or refuse to do so does not constitute entrapment. See State v. Webster, 46
Idaho 798, 798, 271 P. 578, 578 (1928). The evidence presented at trial showed that, by
posing as a fourteen-year-old girl who might be interested in a sexual encounter, Agent
Sutehall simply presented Jackson the option of either enticing a child through the internet
or refusing to do so.

8

B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the

applicable law is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.” Barton,
154 Idaho at 290-91, 297 P.3d at 253-54. 4
C.

The District Court Did Not Err By Refusing To Instruct The Jury On Entrapment
The district court properly refused to instruct the jury on entrapment for two

reasons: First, Jackson could not assert the affirmative defense of entrapment because he
denied that the crime occurred. Second, the evidence presented at trial did not support an
entrapment instruction.
1.

Barton Prohibited The Entrapment Instruction

The district court could not have given the entrapment instruction under Idaho law.
“[T]he applicability of the entrapment defense is a threshold question for whether the jury
should have been instructed on the defense of entrapment.” Barton, 154 Idaho at 291, 297
P.3d at 254. A defendant who denies any element of the charged offense cannot assert the
affirmative defense of entrapment and thus is not entitled to an entrapment jury instruction.
See id. at 291-92, 297 P.3d at 254-55.
In Barton, the Idaho Supreme Court held the district court did not err in refusing
the entrapment instruction because the defendant denied he had the requisite intent to
commit the crime. Id. at 292, 297 P.3d at 255. The state charged Barton with solicitation
of perjury. Id. at 289, 297 P.3d at 252. At trial, “Barton testified that he had no intention

4

Because this Court exercises free review over the district court’s refusal to give the
entrapment instruction, the absence of the district court’s reasoning in the record is of little
import. To the extent necessary, this Court can infer from the record the district court’s
reasoning. See State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, ___, 434 P.3d 209, 213-14 (2019).
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of soliciting or committing perjury.” Id. at 290, 297 P.3d at 253. Barton requested and the
district court refused a jury instruction on entrapment. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held
“that the entrapment defense [was] unavailable to Barton and the request for a jury
instruction on the defense of entrapment was properly denied by the district court” because
“Barton’s defense that he was entrapped into committing the crime [was] inconsistent with
his claim that the criminal offense did not happen.” Id. at 292, 297 P.3d at 255.
This case is indistinguishable from Barton. Like Barton, who denied that the
charged crime occurred when he testified that “he had no intention of soliciting or
committing perjury,” id. at 290, 297 P.3d at 253, Jackson denied that the charged crime
occurred when he testified that did not “solicit a child for sexual purposes” (Tr., p.435,
Ls.3-16; see R., pp.148-49 (instructing the jury that Jackson could only be guilty of the
charged crime if he “knowingly used the internet . . . [t]o solicit . . . a person the defendant
believed to be under the age of sixteen. . . [t]o engage in any sexual act”).) The entrapment
defense and a corresponding instruction were therefore not available to Jackson.
Jackson does not dispute that he denied the crime occurred. (Appellant’s brief,
p.7.) Instead, he argues that “a defendant need not concede that he or she committed the
crime to be entitled to an entrapment instruction.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7 (citing Mathews
v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66 (1988)).) But Mathews is a decision from the United
States Supreme Court that “did not rest on constitutional grounds and is not binding on the
states.” Suits, 143 Idaho at 163, 139 P.3d at 765; accord State v. Soule, 811 P.2d 1071,
1072 (Ariz. 1991) (“Mathews is not based on constitutional interpretation and is binding
on the federal courts only; it is not binding on the states.”). Barton, which postdates
Mathews by twenty-five years, is the law in Idaho and compelled the district court to refuse
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Jackson’s request for an entrapment instruction because Jackson “claim[ed] that the
criminal offense did not happen.” 154 Idaho at 292, 297 P.3d at 255.
2.

The Evidence Did Not Support An Entrapment Instruction

Even if Idaho law did not preclude Jackson from raising an entrapment defense, the
evidence presented at trial did not support an entrapment instruction. “Requested jury
instructions should not be given if they lack support in the facts of the case or are erroneous
statements of the law.” State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 391, 924 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Ct.
App. 1996). A defendant who requests an entrapment instruction “must show that there is
a reasonable view of the evidence presented that would support the theory of entrapment.”
Id. at 392, 924 P.2d at 1236. A government actor merely “giv[ing] an opportunity to either
violate the law or to refuse to do so . . . does not constitute entrapment.” State v. Webster,
46 Idaho 798, 798, 271 P. 578, 578 (1928); see State v. Whitlock, 82 Idaho 540, 542, 356
P.2d 492, 493 (1960).
In Whitlock, the Idaho Supreme Court found no evidence of entrapment where a
state agent gave the defendant an opportunity to make or refuse to make an illegal sale of
liquor. 82 Idaho at 542, 356 P.2d at 493. A state agent approached Whitlock “while he
was engaged in his usual duties of dispatching taxi-cabs.” Id. at 541-42, 356 P.2d at 492.
The state agent asked if Whitlock “could, ‘Fix him up’, to which [Whitlock] answered,
‘What would you like?’ [The state agent] replied, ‘Whiskey.’” Id. at 542, 356 P.2d at 492.
Whitlock told the state agent to wait in his car. Id. at 542, 356 P.2d at 492-93. A short
time later, Whitlock walked to the car and, after a short discussion, provided the state agent
with a pint of vodka. Id. at 542, 356 P.2d at 493. The Idaho Supreme Court found this
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“record . . . disclose[d] no actual entrapment” because “that opportunity was given to
[Whitlock] to make or refuse to make an illegal sale.” Id.
Here, the evidence presented at trial did not support an entrapment instruction
because Agent Sutehall simply gave Jackson “an opportunity to either violate the law or to
refuse to do so.” Webster, 46 Idaho at 798, 271 P. at 578. Just as the state agent in Whitlock
gave Whitlock an opportunity to commit or refuse a crime by requesting that he sell the
state agent whiskey, Agent Sutehall gave Jackson an opportunity to commit or refuse a
crime by introducing himself to Jackson as a fourteen-year-old girl who might be interested
in engaging in sexual activities. (Exs., pp.59, 63.) In fact, Agent Sutehall gave Jackson an
easy out on five separate occasions. (Exs., p.59 (“it’s ok if I’m too young for u, I
understand.”); Exs., p.60 (“I’m not sure we’re looking for the same thing. [smiley face]
think I’ll pass take care.”); Exs., p.63 (“too young for u?”); Exs., p.64 (“sorry to bother you
good luck”); Exs., p.75 (“It’s ok, you seem scared..I understand. take care.”).) But instead
of taking the easy out and declining Agent Sutehall’s invitation to commit a crime, Jackson
pursued Agent Sutehall and, like Whitlock, took the opportunity to violate the law. That
is not entrapment. See Whitlock, 82 Idaho at 542, 356 P.2d at 493.
Jackson points to evidence that Craigslist requires users to confirm they are adults
to show he “was not ready and willing to commit a crime.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) But
the mere fact that Jackson was not necessarily looking to commit the crime at the time
Agent Sutehall presented the opportunity does not convert the encounter into entrapment.
See State v. Ingram, 138 Idaho 768, 773, 69 P.3d 188, 193 (Ct. App. 2003) (“Furnishing
the opportunity is not entrapment but, rather, a legitimate means to ferret out crime.”).
After all, nothing in Whitlock suggests that Whitlock was looking for an opportunity to

12

illegally sell liquor when the state agent approached him. Instead, Whitlock was simply
“engaged in his usual duties of dispatching taxi-cabs” when the state agent approached and
asked to make an illegal purchase. Whitlock, 82 Idaho at 541-42, 356 P.2d at 492.
Jackson also points to statements he made in his conversation with “Haley” that he
was “only interested in someone over the age of consent.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) But at
the time Jackson made that comment, “Haley” had already told him she was only fourteen
years old, and Jackson had already indicated he had no problem with her age. (Exs., pp.5960.) Even if Jackson truly believed fourteen was the age of consent, that is not a defense
to enticing a child through the internet and thus could not possibly serve as evidence that
Jackson was not predisposed to commit that crime. (R., pp.148-51.)
Moreover, the evidence actually showed Jackson was predisposed to commit the
crime. Agent Sutehall identified himself as a fourteen-year-old girl on three occasions, and
on every occasion Jackson’s response showed he had no problem pursuing a sexual
encounter with someone of that age. The first time, “Haley” said she was fourteen and
Jackson responded that they could “still meet” and joked that it “fits with Mormon history.”
(Exs., pp.59-60. 5) The second time, “Natalie” identified herself as the fourteen-year-old
author of a post titled “seeking older man for fun tonight!” and asked if she was too young
for Jackson. (Exs., p.63.) Jackson responded “[n]ope” and asked “Natalie” if she wanted
to text. (Exs., p.63.) The third time, “Natalie” reminded Jackson that she was only fourteen
when Jackson was pushing for anal sex. (Exs., p.67.) Jackson responded that “[i]t feels
good, and shouldn’t hurt.” (Exs., p.67.) Jackson’s ready willingness to continue the sexual

5

Jackson testified: “So in Mormon history . . . they used to have brides that would get
married really young sometimes, so like the older prophets would have wives that were
younger than this.” (Tr., p.384, Ls.3-10.)
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conversation despite being repeatedly told he was speaking with a fourteen-year-old girl
proves he was predisposed to commit the crime. See, e.g., Ingram, 138 Idaho at 772-73,
69 P.3d at 192-93 (holding defendant “could not reasonably be found to be an ‘otherwise
innocent person’ not inclined to commit the offense” because he took the opportunity to
commit a crime without “undue influence, compulsion, or persuasion”).
Jackson also erroneously claims that Agent Sutehall testified at trial that, after his
first conversation with Jackson, Agent Sutehall believed that Jackson was “not predisposed
to commit an offense.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) That is not what Agent Sutehall said.
Agent Sutehall testified that he had multiple conversations going on with multiple targets
simultaneously and that, even though his first conversation with Jackson was “concerning,”
he ended the conversation because “some of those other conversations that I was having
were just more aggressive and posed a higher threat at that point.” (Tr., p.203, Ls.1-9.)
In any event, Jackson initiated a second conversation with Agent Sutehall that was
far more telling than the first. Put simply, only an individual who is predisposed to entice
a child through the internet sends an email to a person who has clearly identified herself as
a fourteen-year-old girl saying that “just showing up at a hotel to fuck you while family is
out[] sounds fun.” (Exs., p.65.) Because the evidence did not support an entrapment
defense, the district court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment entered after a jury
found Jackson guilty of enticing a child through the internet.
DATED this 21st day of May, 2019.

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of May, 2019, served a true and
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DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
db@nbmlaw.com

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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